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Abstract 
 
In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to 
three potential worries for John D. Norton’s material theory of induction 
(Norton, 2003). I attempt to show (1) that his “principle argument” is 
based on a false dichotomy, (2) that the idea that facts ultimately derive 
their license from matters of fact is debatable, and (3) that one of the core 
implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental 
reasons. 
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Introduction 
 
In philosophy of science numerous competing theories that seek 
to provide an adequate systematization of inductive inference 
have been developed (e.g. Bayesianism, IBE, hypothetical 
induction, demonstrative induction, bootstrapping, etc.). At 
present, scholars have not reached consensus on what such 
systematization might look like. How do we account for this 
proliferation of competing accounts? 
In part to explain this proliferation, Norton defended and 
spelled out a “material theory of induction” (Norton, 2003), 
according to which “[a]ll inductions ultimately derive their licenses 
from facts pertinent to the matter of the induction” (p. 650 [italics in 
original], cf. p. 668). According to J.D. Norton, the quest for a 
universal systematization of inductive reasoning is futile, since 
all inductive inferences are “grounded in matters of fact that 
hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is 
local” (Norton, 2003, p. 647 [emphasis in original]).1 That we 
have failed to provide a universal framework is “not because of a 
lack of effort or imagination, but because we seek a goal that in 
                                                 
1  Strictly speaking, Norton provides a material theory of 
ampliative reasoning in general. 
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principle cannot be found” (p. 648). I agree with Norton on the 
futility of the quest for a universal account of inductive 
reasoning: inductive inference is a inductive reasoning is such a 
complex phenomena – for instance, it includes not only standard 
enumerative reasoning, but also hypothetical reasoning, 
eliminative reasoning, etc. – that an overarching account seems 
rather impossible or, if such account turned out to be possible after 
all, it would be so vague that it becomes futile in specific domains. 
Different accounts of inductive inference should therefore rather 
be seen as complementing each other: different accounts have 
their use in different domains, and taken together they form a 
repertoire for handling inductive reasoning in various domains. 
Developing a rich and domain-sensitive repertoire (or 
instrumentarium) is definitely the way to go and seems more 
promising that the quest for an inductionis logica universalis. 
According to Norton’s material theory of induction, the 
admissibility of an induction is traced back to matters of facts 
and not to “universal schemas”, which derive from a formal 
theory (p. 648). Inductive inferences derive their license from 
facts; facts are therefore the “material” of inductive inferences. 
For instance, Norton considers the case in which the melting 
points of bismuth and wax are observed. In the case of bismuth 
our observation of several samples of heated bismuth, showing 
that the samples have a melting point at 271°C, correctly 
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underwrites our generalization that all samples of bismuth have 
a melting point at 271°C. In the case of wax, however, our 
observation of several samples of wax, showing that the samples 
of heated wax have a melting point at 91°C, does not correctly 
underwrite our generalization that all samples of wax have a 
melting point at 91°C, since contrary to bismuth wax is a generic 
name for a family of substances. Norton then comments as 
follows: 
 
In the material theory, the admissibility of an induction is ultimately 
traced back to a matter of fact, not a universal schema. We are licensed 
to infer from the melting point of some samples of an element to the 
melting point of all samples by a fact about elements, we have a license to 
infer that other samples will most likely have the same properties. The 
license does not come from the form of the inference, that we proceed 
from a “some…” to an “all….” It comes from the fact relevant to the 
material of the induction. (p. 650) 
 
By “formal theories” Norton means something very broad 
– which I shall henceforth refer to as (FT): 
 
They are certainly not limited to accounts of induction within some 
formalized language or logic. The defining characteristic is just that the 
admissibility of an inductive inference is ultimately grounded in some 
universal template. (p. 649 [emphasis added], cf. p. 669) 
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The material theory, by contrast, is based “on the supposition 
that the material postulates obtain in specific domains; that is, 
facts that obtain “locally”” (p. 652). They are admissible “in the 
right context” (p. 669). For instance, a universal schema for 
inductive inference based on simplicity is absent and “our 
decisions as to what is simple or simpler depend essentially 
upon the facts or laws that we believe to prevail” (p. 656 
[emphasis added]). Idem for Inference to the Best Explanation (p. 
658). Then Norton states his Principle Argument - which I shall 
henceforth refer to as “PA”: 
 
(PA) 
 
My principal argument for a local material theory of induction is that no 
inductive inference schema can be both universal and function 
successfully. (p. 652) 
 
Somewhat further in the paper, Norton spells out an important 
implication of his account – which I shall henceforth refer to as 
“Imp”: 
 
(Imp) 
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At the same time, exactly because we learn more from the new evidence, 
we also augment our inductive schemas. For according to the material 
theory, all these schemas obtain only locally and are ultimately anchored 
in the facts of the domain. Crudely, the more we know, the better we can 
infer inductively. The result is that scientists do not need to pay so much 
attention explicitly to inductive inference. As we saw in the examples of 
section 4 [Norton is referring to Lavoisier’s chemistry and Leverrier’s 
discovery of Neptune], with each major advance in science has come a 
major advance in our inductive powers. The mere fact of learning more will 
augment their inductive powers automatically. (p. 664 [emphasis added]) 
 
In cases like these, “the added inferential power that comes from 
knowing more does not come from the delivery of some new 
schema” (p. 663) and thus Norton’s account “does not separate 
facts from inductive inference schema[s]” (p. 669). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Now I shall assess the tenability of Norton’s account. I shall 
argue that Norton’s account, as it stands, is untenable for tree 
fundamental reasons. 
 
Worry 1: Either Material or Universal: A False Dilemma 
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My first point is that the fact that no universal inductive 
schemas are at hand does not establish the claim that all 
inductive inferences are licensed by mere matters of fact. 
Norton’s acceptance of the material theory of induction is based 
on his rejection of what he calls formal theories (FT), which are 
by definition, i.e. by Norton’s definition, universal. The 
observation that, up until the present no universal and 
successful inductive schema has been established, motivates 
Norton to opt for his material account of induction – his 
argument is basically a disjunctive syllogism. However, Norton 
neglects at least one alternative: that non-“material” schemas are 
local. By “non-material schemas” I refer to those schemas which 
license inductive generalisations without being completely 
data-driven (also see infra). Although I agree with Norton that 
all inductive inferences have their origin in empirical knowledge 
(stated more clearly: that empirical knowledge is a necessary 
condition for induction), I disagree that inductive schemas are 
exclusively licensed by matters of fact. Inductive inferences are, by 
definition, data driven, but not completely determined by the 
data. As Daniel Steel has pointed out, they also depend upon 
“judgements concerning the desiderata of inductive reasoning” 
(Steel, 2005, p. 189), i.e. on normative components. Indeed, local 
schemas contain interpretative and pragmatic components which 
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do not, in a straightforward way, relate to empirical knowledge. 
Inductive schemas cannot be directly “read off” the phenomena 
under consideration. Consider, for instance, that logically 
characterizing an inductive consequence relation is not a 
straightforward empirical thing: it involves fixing structural 
relations between sets of premises and their consequence sets.2  
 Norton does not make the distinction between 
formulating an empirical theory of induction and a normative 
theory of induction. He limits a generic theory of induction to 
the empirical components of a theory of induction and, 
correspondingly, bypasses the important normative features of 
inductive reasoning. I am inclined that this justifies the claim 
that Norton’s theory of induction is not a complete account of 
induction, as it stands. A theory of induction should address the 
normative features of induction, i.e. it should spell out – given a 
certain context – what the criteria of valid inductive inference 
are in cases where other than strictly empirical considerations 
license inductive generalizations. What Norton has successfully 
proven, however, is that inductive schemas are contextual. 
 
                                                 
2 Adaptive logics have been used to characterize several inductive 
consequence relations (see Batens & Haesaert, 2001, Batens, 2005, and 
Batens, 2006). 
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Worry 2: Can matters of fact “ultimately” license inductive generalizations? 
Moreover, the idea that empirical generalisations ultimately 
derive their license from the relevant facts of a domain is 
somewhat debatable. Suppose that scientist1 (S1) and scientist2 (S2) 
reason from two mutually inconsistent theories (T1 and T2), that 
the choice between them cannot be obviously decided on 
strictly empirical grounds, and that both scientists have 
different theoretical views and background assumptions: BG1 
and BG2 respectively (I use BG to refer to both the theoretical 
views and background assumptions). While scientist1 might try 
to isolate the consistent parts of T1, scientist2 might try to isolate 
the consistent parts of T2 – for reasons relative to their 
theoretical views and background assumptions (see figure 1). 
Obviously, such BG’s might refer to epistemic values (in the 
sense of McMullin, 1983). 
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Figure 1. 
 
Note that the inductive generalisations in this example are 
licensed by their respective BG’s (for scientist1 the inductive 
generalization is licensed by BG1; for scientist2 the inductive 
generalization is licensed by BG2). Thus: at a certain moment in 
the development of science, in which the choice between two 
theories was empirically undecidable, specific inductive 
strategies, which are based on BG’s, licensed specific inductive 
generalizations. One might respond to this that in the long run 
the consistent theory will be detected, but this seems rather 
untenable. There is no guarantee that inductive generalization 
in general will “ultimately” become empirically decidable. It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that epistemic values and other 
S1 
T1 T2 
CT1 
S2 
T1 T2 
CT2 
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relevant BG will continue to play an important rôle in future 
science and inductive reasoning. 
 
Worry 3: Why Imp Is Untenable: Fundamentally and Historically 
According to Imp, the mere fact of having more and more 
empirical knowledge automatically improves our inductive 
powers. So according to Norton, both are closely aligned and he 
essentially argues that the quantity of the empirical data at our 
disposal (Q(ED)) is directly proportional to the improvement of our 
inductive powers (I(IP)). This conclusion is, however, untenable 
for two reasons: 
 
O1: It is possible that a cornucopia of empirical data 
is at hand, but that no significant inductions are 
made based upon these data (i.e. there might be 
Q(EM) without I(IP)). 
 
O2: It is possible that our inductive inferences turn 
out to be false, empirically speaking, but shed light 
on normatively sound inductive criteria – valid 
within a domain of application (i.e. there might be 
I(IP) without (Q(EM)). 
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As an example of O1, we might consider the fact that 
although Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler had the same data at 
their disposal, embodied in the Rudolphine Tables (finally 
published by Kepler in 1627), only Kepler succeeded in deriving 
his so-called laws (which were, in fact, considered as rules at 
the time). The tables were generally considered trustworthy and 
accurate to two or three minutes of arc (Wilson, 1972, p. 2; 
Stephenson, 1987). That extending our data automatically 
improves our inductive inferences is therefore a non sequitur.  
Joan Baptiste Van Helmont’s tree experiment provides an 
ample illustration of O2. Van Helmont reported on the following 
experiment (see Ducheyne, 2005 for further details):  
 
But I have learned by this handicraft-operation, that all Vegetables do 
immediately, and materially proceed out of the Element of Water only. 
For I took an Earthen Vessel [vas], in which I put 200 pounds of Earth 
that had been dried in a Furnace, weighing five pounds; and at length, 
five years being finished, the Tree sprung from thence, did weigh 169 
pounds, and about three ounces: But I moystened the Earthen Vessel 
with Rain-water, or distilled water (always when there was need) and it 
was large, and implanted into the Earth and least the dust that flew 
about should be co-mingled with the Earth, I covered the lip of the 
mouth of the Vessel, with an Iron-plate with Tin, and easily passable 
with many wholes. At length, I again dried the Earth of the Vessel, and 
there were found the same 200 pounds, wanting about two ounces. 
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Therefore 164 pounds of Wood, Barks, and Roots, arose out of water 
onely.3 (Van Helmont, 1664, p. 109) 
 
The explanandum here is the weight and growth of plants. First of 
all, the weight of the earth is measured. That the earth has been 
dried on a fire and is isolated from the external world by means 
of a plate is significant here, since these conditions guarantee, 
according to van Helmont, that no other elements than earth 
could reside in the pot. That the water is distilled (or is 
rainwater) equally guarantees that no other elements than 
water reside in the pot. (This assumption was later challenged 
by James Woodward (1700).) In contemporary parlance, we 
                                                 
3  Translation of: “Omnia verro vegetabilia immediatè, & 
materialiter, ex solo aquae elemento prodire hac mechanica didici. Caepi 
enim vas terreum in quo posui terrae in clibano arefactae 200, quam 
madefeci aqua pluvia, illique implantavi truncum salicis, 
ponderantem 5. ac tandem exacto quinquennio, arbor inde prognata 
pendebat 169, & circiter unas tres. Vas autem terreum, sola aqua 
pluvial, vel distillata, semper (ubi opus erat) maduit, eratque amplum, & 
terrae implantatum, & ne pulvis obvolitans terrae commisceretur, lamina 
ferrae, stanno obducta, multoque foramina pervia, labrum vas tegebat. 
Non computavi pondus soliorum quaterno autumno deciduorum. 
Tandem iterum siccavi terram vasis, & repertae sunt eaedem librae 200 
duabus circiter uniciis minus. Librae ergo 164 ligni, corticum, & radicum, 
ex sola aqua surrexerant.” (Van Helmont, 1648, pp. 108-109). 
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would say that Van Helmont attempted to control these 
variables (the amount of earth and water). Then, the gained 
weight of the tree is measured (ca. 164 pounds). Note however 
that after five years Van Helmont weighed the “Wood, Barks, 
and Roots”. Apparently, Van Helmont did not include the 
weight of the leaves for a reason unknown to me. Notice further 
that Van Helmont is not worried at all by difference of two 
ounces. Given that there did not reside any other elements than 
earth and water in the pot, and that the earth did not diminish 
significantly, Van Helmont (wrongly) concluded that only the 
water produces the growth of the tree. According to Van Helmont, 
only the addition of the water can explain the growth of the 
plant. 
We now know that Van Helmont was completely wrong, 
but his experiment sought (quite unsuccessfully) to provide a 
controlled experiment, where certain variables are kept fixed and 
others varied. Although he was wrong, he had some profound 
insights how inductive inferences should be based on controlled 
experiments. This is what exactly what van Helmont’s attempted 
with his tree-experiment: the earth is kept constant and the 
water is purified. In many of Van Helmont’s experiments, 
procedures of keeping variables fixed – as well as reference to 
relatively closed physical systems, in which all external variables 
are screened off – frequently occur (again see Ducheyne, 2005). 
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Van Helmont had a particular and profound insight in the idea 
that knowledge of nature is produced by isolating certain natural 
processes or creating – or at least, trying to create as good as 
possible – relatively closed physical systems. In line with the 
above interpretation, Woodward’s refutation of Van Helmont’s 
willow experiment included both more exactness and more 
variables being fixed. Woodward weighed plants and the 
composition of water in more detail. He put different plants of 
the same kind near the same window (hence: species, warmth, 
and, amount of air and light are kept fixed) (Woodward, 1700, p. 
199). He further compared water of different origin (rain water, 
Thames water, etc.) and constructed an artefact which 
guaranteed that the water can only be exhaled by the plants 
(ibid., pp. 201-202). Van Helmont’s intuitions on controlled 
experimentation were later put to practice more successfully by 
Woodward in 1700.  
 
 
How the Previous Problem can be Resolved 
The previous problem can be avoided by simply distinguishing 
between descriptive and normative features of induction. O1 is 
then explained by pointing to the fact that our empirical 
knowledge is well-developed but our corresponding inductive 
criteria are not (O2 is then explained conversely). 
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Conclusion 
 
Future research should highlight the locality of inductive 
criteria in scientific praxis. I contend that studying specific 
branches of science and by further developing logical systems 
for inductive reasoning will offer promising paths to do so. 
Despite Norton’s appealing inductive anti-mono-criterial 
attitude and his equally attractive pluralism, his account faces 
three serious drawbacks. I have briefly outlined how they can be 
avoided by modifying Norton’s proposal but with sticking to its 
pluralistic core. If correct, this analysis shows that PA and Imp 
are untenable. 
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